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Monitoring Board Committee Structure and Market Valuation in Large 
Publicly Listed South African Corporations 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the association between the presence of monitoring board committees (i.e., 
audit, nomination, and remuneration) and market valuation in South Africa using a 
sample of listed corporations. We find a significant positive connection between the 
presence of monitoring board committees and market valuation, but only in corporations 
that have independent monitoring board committees and/or all three monitoring board 
committees that we have investigated simultaneously. This implies that the market values 
corporations with independent and/or the three monitoring board committees more highly. 
Our results provide empirical support for agency theory, which indicates that the presence 
of independent board committees increases the capacity of corporate boards to effectively 
advise, monitor and discipline top management, and thereby improving market valuation. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; monitoring board committees; market valuation; 
endogeneity; South Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the connection between the presence of monitoring 
board committees and market valuation using a sample of large publicly listed 
corporations in South Africa (SA). SA has pursued corporate governance (CG) reforms, 
mainly in the shape of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports (Rossouw et al., 2002; 
Andreasson, 2012). Generally, the King Reports have focused on improving CG 
standards in SA (Rossouw, 2005; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). More precisely, 
however, the reforms have focused on enhancing market value by improving the capacity 
of corporate boards to effectively advise, monitor and discipline corporate executives 
(West, 2006, 2009). One way of measuring a corporate board’s capacity to effectively 
perform their advising, monitoring and disciplining role is the presence of independent 
board committees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration committees (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993).  
Harrison (1987) suggests there are two main types of board committees: 
monitoring/oversight and advising/operating. Advising/operating board committees, such 
as executive, finance, production, marketing, safety, health and environment, and 
information technology, amongst others, advise management and the board on major 
business decisions. By contrast, their monitoring counterparts, such as audit, nomination, 
and remuneration are intended to protect shareholder interests by providing objective and 
independent assessment of executive decisions and actions.  
A number of advantages exist for having board committees, and in particular 
monitoring ones. For example, and due to their relative small size, monitoring board 
committees are able to meet more frequently (Vefeas, 1999a, b; Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009). This provides sufficient time for meaningful dialogue and in reaching 
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consensus decisions quicker (Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005). 
Similarly, and by their composition
1
, board committees help in bringing individual 
director’s specialist knowledge and expertise to bear on the board decision-making 
process (Harrison, 1987; Carcello et al., 2002). This also allows the main board to devote 
attention to specific areas of strategic interests and responsibility (Klein, 1998; Sun and 
Cahan, 2009). Thus, having independent monitoring board committees can improve firm 
valuation by enhancing the capacity of corporate boards in reducing the number of 
avenues by which opportunistic managers can expropriate corporate resources through 
greater monitoring. 
 SA provides an interesting setting to investigate the link between the presence of 
monitoring board committees and market valuation. In line with other Anglo-Saxon 
countries, SA has carried out CG reforms in the shape of the King Reports. With 
particular respect to monitoring board committees and as will be discussed further, the 
King Reports recommend that SA corporations should at least set-up audit, nomination 
and remuneration committees in order to enhance the effectiveness of the board to advise, 
monitor and discipline top management. This suggests that the King Reports perceive the 
presence of independent monitoring board committees as a good CG practice. 
Consequently, the main aim of this paper is to investigate the connection between the 
presence of monitoring board committees and market valuation in SA, and thereby 
making a number of new contributions to the existing literature.  
 First, using a sample of SA listed corporations, we offer evidence on the effect of 
monitoring board committees on market valuation. This constitutes one of the first 
                                                 
1Unlike the main board, directors with specialist knowledge and expertise normally constitute board committees. The 
King Reports suggest, for example, that a majority of the audit committee members must be financially literate and 
preferably with practical financial management experience.  
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attempts at estimating the impact of monitoring board committees on market valuation 
within a Sub-Saharan African context, with particular focus on SA, and thus crucially 
extends the literature to that sub-continent. This also contributes to the largely advanced 
countries-based literature on the connection between monitoring board committees and 
market valuation. Second, we innovatively demonstrate that monitoring board 
committees have a positive effect on market valuation, but only in corporations that have 
independent board committees and/or have established all three monitoring board 
committees. Finally, and distinct from most previous studies, we apply econometric 
models that sufficiently control for different types of endogeneities and market valuation 
proxies.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on CG reforms 
and the SA corporate setting. Section 3 presents the literature review. Section 4 describes 
the data. Section 5 contains the empirical analyses, whereas section 6 concludes. 
 
2. CG policy reforms, monitoring board committees and the SA corporate setting 
 Although CG has long been in SA in the form of the 1861 Companies Act, there 
is a general consensus that the introduction of the King Reports explicitly 
institutionalised CG practices in SA (West, 2006, 2009; Andreasson, 2012). This began 
with the publication of the first King Report (King I) in 1994 (King Committee, 2002; 
Managena and Chamisa, 2008). The recommendations of King I were largely influenced 
by those of the powerful 1992 UK Cadbury Report (Rossouw, 2005; Andreasson, 2012). 
For instance, and in line with the Cadbury Report, King I recommended an Anglo-Saxon 
style unitary board of directors, constituted by executive and non-executive directors, 
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who operate within a voluntary (‘comply or explain’) compliance CG regime (Cadbury 
Committee, 1992; King Committee, 2002).  
 With particular regard to monitoring board committees, and similar to the 
Cadbury Report, King I outlined their role in helping the board to effectively advise, 
monitor and discipline top management (King Committee, 1994; Ntim, 2009, 2011). 
However, King I suffered from several limitations. First, and different from the Cadbury 
Report, which recommended that companies should at least set-up audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees, King I only required SA corporations to set-up only audit and 
remuneration committees (Rossouw et al., 2002; West, 2006, 2009), excluding the need 
for the establishment of a nomination committee. Such a committee would have 
nominated new independent directors for appointment to the board, which would have 
arguably improved board independence. Arguably, this undermined board functions, 
where true independence from management was required (King Committee, 2002).  
 Second, King I was unable to insist on a truly independent non-executive director 
to chair SA corporate boards (West, 2006, 2009). This deviation from Cadbury also 
impaired board independence and increased potential conflicts of interests (Ntim et al., 
2012a, b). Third, and while King I called for the establishment of a remuneration 
committee, it failed to establish the economic rationale or specific rules that should guide 
corporations in determining the level of their directors’ remuneration. In this case, it 
failed to sway away the concerns of shareholders and the general public about director 
and executive remuneration (King Committee, 2002; Rossouw, 2005). These deviations 
from the Cadbury Report arguably weakened the effectiveness of monitoring board 
committees under King I (King Committee, 2002; Ntim et al., 2012a, b).  
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As a result, King I was revised and replaced with a second King Report (King II) 
in 2002 with the objective of addressing some of the limitations of King I. King II made a 
number of new recommendations with particular regard to monitoring board committees. 
First, it suggested that every SA firm should at least set-up audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees. Second, it provided a clear definition of independence and 
clearly grouped directors into executive, non-executive and independent non-executive 
directors (King Committee, 2002; Ntim, 2009). Third, and most importantly, King II did 
not only recommend that monitoring board committees should consist of a majority of 
independent non-executive directors, but also the chairman of each monitoring board 
committee should additionally be an independent non-executive director (King 
Committee, 2002; Andreasson, 2012). Arguably, this enhanced the independence and 
monitoring capacity of board committees under King II than King I.  
However, the SA corporate context has unique features of greater block and 
institutional ownerships, mainly in the shape of tall pyramidical structures and 
complicated cross-shareholdings, but shareholder activism, as well as the capacity to 
implement and enforce of corporate regulations are observably weak (West, 2006; Ntim, 
2012a, b). Therefore, critical concerns have been raised as to whether, given the SA 
corporate setting, a voluntary compliance CG regime like King II will be effective in 
improving CG standards by enhancing the capacity of corporate boards to effectively 
advise, monitor and discipline top management (Rosssouw et al., 2002). Hence, this 
paper seeks to examine whether the recommendations of the King Reports with specific 
regard to monitoring board committees has any impact on market valuation in SA. 
 
3. Literature review: Theory, evidence and the development of hypothesis 
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Prior literature suggests that board committees help improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of corporate boards (Dalton et al., 1998; Jiraporn et al., 2009). As previously 
explained, and according to Harrison (1987) there are two generic types of board 
committees: monitoring/oversight and advising/operating. Advising/operating board 
committees advise management and the board on major business decision. Their 
monitoring counterparts are intended to protect shareholder interests by providing 
objective and independent review of executive decisions and actions.  
Agency theory suggests that a central monitoring function of the board is to 
ensure that corporate activities are properly audited (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen 1983a). It also includes ensuring that directors and senior management are 
adequately remunerated, and to nominate qualified individuals for appointment to fill 
director and top management positions (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 
2009). As a corollary, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of monitoring board 
committees over the last three decades (Harrison, 1987; Daily et al., 2003). Key among 
them is audit, remuneration and nomination committees. In fact, almost every CG code of 
the modern era has called for the institution of these board committees (Cadbury Report, 
1992; King Reports, 1994, 2002). 
Despite their increasing popularity, however, there are still conflicting theoretical 
propositions as to the nexus between monitoring board committees and market valuation. 
One line of the theoretical literature suggests that the establishment of these committees 
can impact positively on market valuation (Harrison, 1987; Wild, 1994; Sun and Cahan, 
2009). First, and unlike the main board or operating committees, such as finance and 
executive committees, monitoring board committees are usually entirely composed of 
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independent non-executive (NEDs), making them better placed to protect shareholders’ 
interests by effectively scrutinising managerial actions (Klein, 1998; Vefeas, 1999b). 
 Second, and by their relative small size, board committees are able to meet more 
frequently. This provides sufficient time for meaningful dialogue and in reaching 
consensus decisions quicker (Weir et al., 2002; Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005). Third, and 
by their composition, board committees help in bringing individual director’s specialist 
knowledge and expertise to bear on the board decision-making process (Harrison, 1987; 
Dalton et al., 1998). This also allows the main board to devote attention to specific areas 
of strategic interests and responsibility.  
Finally, board committees enhance corporate accountability, legitimacy and 
credibility by performing specialist functions (Goodstein et al., 1994; Weir et al., 2002). 
The principal function of the audit committee, for example, is to meet regularly with the 
firm’s external and internal auditors to review the company’s financial statements, audit 
processes and internal accounting controls. This helps reduce agency costs and 
information asymmetry by facilitating timely release of unbiased accounting information 
by managers to shareholders (Wild, 1994; Klein, 1998). Also, effective monitoring by the 
audit committee may help minimise financial fraud and increase firm value.  
The remuneration committee determines and reviews the nature and amount of all 
compensation for directors and senior officers of the firm. This also helps in reducing the 
agency problem by implementing remuneration schemes and incentives designed to 
better align the interests of managers and shareholders (Klein, 1998; Weir and Laing, 
2000). The nomination committee is responsible for nominating candidates for 
appointment to the board. This minimises the agency conflict by improving board 
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independence and the quality of appointed directors (Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; 
Vefeas, 1999b).  
By contrast, others suggest board committees can impact negatively on market 
valuation. First, the establishment of board committees imposes extra costs in terms of 
managerial time, travel expenses and additional remuneration for the members of the 
committees (Vefeas, 1999a; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). Second, it can result in 
excessive managerial supervision, which can inhibit executive initiative and vision 
(Goodstein, et al., 1994; Conger et al., 1998; Vefeas, 1999a, b). Third, it may also result 
in duplicating corporate board duties and responsibilities. This will have additional costs 
implications for firms. Finally, and by creating generalists and specialists among board 
members, board committees have the potential of generating conflicts in ideas and 
impairing boardroom cohesion (Weir and Laing, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002). 
 The empirical literature regarding the association between the presence of 
monitoring board committees and market valuation is still at its embryonic stage (Dalton 
et al., 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999). The little available evidence also largely focuses on 
developed markets, such as the UK and the US. This makes generalisation difficult. 
Further, the limited evidence offers contradictory conclusions. This makes board 
committee structures a fertile area for further research, especially within a developing 
country context. It may help shed additional insights on the monitoring board committee 
structure-market valuation relationship. The results can also be compared with previous 
international studies on monitoring board committees.  
In line with the theoretical literature, a strand of the empirical literature suggests a 
positive connection between the presence of monitoring board committees and market 
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valuation (Wild, 1994; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009). Wild 
(1994) examines market reaction before and after the establishment of audit committees 
by a sample of 260 US firms from 1966 to 1980. He reports a statistically significant 
improvement in share returns following the establishment of audit committees, which 
suggests that the presence of audit committees can enhance managerial accountability to 
shareholders. Recent evidence by Vefeas and Karamanous (2005) in 275 Fortune 500 
firms is consistent with the findings of prior research that suggests that the presence of 
audit committees is positively associated with market valuation. 
Using a sample of 606 large US listed corporations, Vefeas (1999b) documents a 
positive relationship between the establishment of nomination committees and the quality 
of new director appointments. This implies that nomination committees can improve 
board quality, which may ultimately improve the effectiveness with which the board 
carries out its monitoring and advisory roles. In separate studies, but using samples of US 
listed firms, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Sun and Cahan (2009) report a 
significant decrease in CEO compensation for US firms with independent compensation 
committees compared with those without compensation committees. This suggests that 
the establishment of independent compensation committees is associated with better 
monitoring of managerial compensation.  
Of special interest to this study, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find in a sample of 
81 SA listed firms that the presence of an audit committee significantly reduces the 
possibility of a firm being suspended from the stock exchange. This indicates that the 
presence of audit committees improve internal monitoring, reduce internal fraud and 
enhance compliance with corporate regulations.  
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 By contrast, others have offered evidence, which shows that the presence of board 
committees impact negatively on market valuation (Main and Johnston, 1993; Vefeas, 
1999a). In a sample of 220 large British listed corporations, Main and Johnston (1993) 
examine the role of remuneration committees in British boardrooms. They report that the 
presence of a remuneration committee is associated with higher executive pay, which 
reduces shareholder value. Similarly, using 307 US listed firms from 1990 to1994, 
Vefeas (1999a) reports a negative relationship between the establishment of board 
committees (namely, audit, remuneration, and nomination) and firm value.  
 A third stream of studies suggests no empirical relationship between board 
committees and market valuation (Klein, 1998; Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and 
Weir, 1999). Using a sample of 486 US firms over the period 1992-1993, Klein (1998) 
examines the association between the presence of audit, compensation, and nomination 
committees and market valuation, but finds no statistically significant relationship. 
Further, she demonstrates that her result is robust irrespective of the changes in the 
composition of the committees’ membership. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) investigate 
the impact of audit, remuneration and nomination committees on the market valuation of 
250 UK listed firms in 1994. They find no evidence in favour of the idea that the 
existence of the three board committees significantly affected market valuation. Recently, 
Weir and Laing (2000), Weir et al. (2002), Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), and Bozec 
(2005) provide evidence, which shows that the establishment of the three board 
committees has no significant impact on market valuation. 
 Despite the conflicting empirical evidence, and as has been discussed in section 2, 
the King Reports require SA listed corporations to institute audit, remuneration, and 
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nomination committees. They specify that each committee should be chaired by an 
independent NED. They must also be composed either entirely of independent NEDs (in 
the case of the remuneration committee) or by a majority of independent NEDs (in the 
case of audit and nomination committees). Further, the audit committee members must be 
financially literate and should be chaired by a person other than the chairperson of the 
board. This suggests that the King Reports expect that the establishment of monitoring 
board committees may directly or indirectly impact positively on market valuation, and 
thus our main hypothesis is that:   
 H1: There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
presence of audit, nomination and remuneration committees, and market 
valuation. 
 
4. Data 
 Due to capital structure and regulatory reasons, 291 corporations listed on the JSE 
as at 31/12/2007 from eight non-financial industries (basic materials, consumer goods, 
consumer services, health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, and telecoms) were 
sampled. We use CG and financial variables to investigate the impact of monitoring 
board committees on market valuation. The CG variables were extracted from the annual 
reports of the sampled corporations’. The annual reports were downloaded from the 
Perfect Information Database. The financial data were taken from Datastream. The 
corporations in our final sample had to meet two criteria. First, a corporation’s complete 
5-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 inclusive are available. Second, the 
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corporation’s corresponding financial data from 2003 to 2007 is also available.2 Applying 
the above criteria, the complete data needed is obtained for a total of 169 firms over 5-
firm years and 8 industries for our regression analysis.  
 
5. Empirical analyses  
5.1 Summary descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 presents complete definitions and summary statistics of all (market 
valuation, CG and control) variables that we use in estimating our regressions. Table 1 
shows, for example, that Q, which is our main (although as a sensitivity check, we 
employ ROA and TSR as alternative market valuation proxies) market valuation measure, 
is between a minimum of 0.72 and a maximum of 3.60 with a median of 1.34. The 
ALCOM (NCOM) ranges from a minimum of 0% (0%) to a maximum of 100% (100%) 
with a mean of 45% (47%). The alternative market valuation variables (ROA and TSR), 
and the control variables (BIG4, CAPX, CGCO, CSLIST, GOWN, and SGR), which we 
include in our regressions in order address potential omitted variables bias, also show 
wide variations. This implies that our sample has been sufficiently selected to obtain 
adequate variation, and thus minimises any possibilities of sample selection bias.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
5.2 Multivariate regression analyses 
Corporations tend to differ in the difficulties and prospects that they encounter 
over-time. This may lead to a situation whereby monitoring board committee structure 
                                                 
2
It takes time for board decisions to reflect in market value (Boyd, 1995; Ntim, 2011, 2012a, b; Ntim et al., 
2012a, b). Therefore, to avoid endogenous association between the presence of monitoring board 
committees and market valuation, we introduce a one year lag between the presence of monitoring board 
committee structure and market valuation such that this year’s market value depends on last year’s CG 
structure, as specified in equation (1) below. 
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and Q are jointly and dynamically determined by firm-specific differences, such as 
company complexity, managerial talent and corporate culture (Guest, 2009; Ntim, 2009, 
2011, 2012a, b), which simple ordinary least square regressions may fail to identify 
(Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010), and thereby resulting in misleading 
findings. Hence, given the panel nature of our data and in line with previous studies 
(Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim, 2011, 2012a, b; Ntim et al., 2012a, b), we conduct 
fixed-effects regressions in order to control for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneities. 
As such, we begin our analysis with a simple fixed-effect regression specified as follows: 
             

 
n
i
itititiitit CONTROLSBCOMQ
1
111110                     (1) 
where: Q is the main dependent variable, BCOM is the main independent variable 
referring to either ACOM, NCOM, RCOM or ALCOM, CONTROLS refers to the control 
variables, including BIG4, CAPX, CGCO, CLIST, GOWN, SGR, IND and YED, and δ 
refers to the firm-level fixed-effects, consisting of a vector of 168 year dummies to 
represent the 169 sampled corporations. 
Table 2 reports the findings of fixed-effects regressions of the presence of 
monitoring board committees on Q. First, to investigate whether the presence of the three 
monitoring board committees is connected to Q, we run Q on ACOM, NCOM, and RCOM 
with the control variables using equation (1) separately. Positive, but statistically 
insignificant impact of ACOM and RCOM on Q is noticeable in Models 1 and 3 of Table 
2, and thereby providing support for the findings of past studies that report no link 
between the presence of monitoring board committees and market valuation (Klein, 1998; 
Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999). The coefficient on NCOM in 
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Model 2 of Table 2 is, however, narrowly statistically significant.
3
 Second, and since the 
individual monitoring committees have largely statistically insignificant effect on Q, we 
re-regress equation (1) using firms that have set-up all three monitoring board committees 
(ALCOM) on Q. Positive and statistically significant effect on ALCOM  on Q in Model 4 
of Table 2 is discernible, and thereby providing support for H1 and the recommendations 
of King II, as well as the findings of prior studies (Wild, 1994; Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009) that suggest that the presence of monitoring board 
committees has a positive impact on market valuation.
4
  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Third, and given that a high proportion (over 90%, see Table 1) of our sample 
have ACOM and RCOM in particular, their insignificance may be due to the limited 
variability in the sample. Therefore, to ascertain whether our findings are driven by this 
phenomenon, we re-run our analysis by focusing only on corporations with independent 
audit committee (IACOM), independent nomination committee (INCOM), and 
independent remuneration committee (IRCOM). As the King Reports set stricter tests for 
independent non-executive directors than non-executive directors, such as not having 
professional, ownership, employment, family, supplier and customer connections (see 
King Committee, 2002), independent monitoring board committees can be expected to be 
more effective at monitoring and disciplining top management, and hence, a higher 
market valuation for corporations with independent monitoring board committees than 
those without. We test this proposition by re-regressing equation (1) by replacing ACOM, 
                                                 
3
We also re-run equation (1) by including ACOM, NCOM and RCOM together, but the results remain the same with the 
ACOM and RCOM being statistically insignificant, whilst NCOM remains narrowly significant at the 10% level.  
4
We further re-run equation (1) by including ACOM, NCOM and RCOM together with ALCOM, but the results remain 
unchanged with the ACOM, NCOM and RCOM being statistically insignificant, whilst ALCOM remains significant at 
the 1% level.  
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NCOM, and RCOM with IACOM, INCOM and IRCOM, one at a time, respectively. 
Consistent with our prediction, positive and statistically significant effect of IACOM, 
INCOM, and IRCOM on Q is noticeable in Models  5 to 7 of Table 2, and thereby 
providing further support for H1, as well as the recommendations of the King Reports.
 5
 
The evidence also implies that it is the independence of the committee rather than the 
mere existence that can have a significant positive impact on market valuation. 
Theoretically, our findings are consistent with agency theory that suggests that 
corporate boards with independent monitoring committees have increased ability to 
effectively advise, monitor and discipline top management, and thereby enhancing 
market valuation (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Our evidence also provides 
support for both the recommendations of the King Reports and the results of past studies 
(Wild, 1994; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009) that document a 
positive link between the presence of monitoring board committees and market valuation, 
but contradict those that either report a negative (Main and Johnston, 1993; Vefeas, 
1999a) or no (Klein, 1998; Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999) 
connection with market valuation.  
 
5.3 Additional analyses 
We carry out two additional analyses to ascertain the robustness of our results. 
First, we examine the sensitivity of our findings to two alternative market valuation 
measures: return on assets (ROA – an accounting based measure) and total share returns 
(TSR – a market based proxy). The results based on using ROA and TSR, respectively, 
instead of Q, which for brevity are not reported here, but available upon request, suggest 
                                                 
5
We get similar results if we re-run our regressions by including IACOM, INCOM and IRCOM at the same time.  
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a statistically significant and positive effect of ALCOM on ROA and TSR on Q, and 
thereby implying that our results are not sensitive to using an accounting (ROA) or a 
market (TSR) based proxy of firm valuation, instead of Q. 
Second, and to control for potential endogeneity problems that may be caused by 
omitted variable bias, we use the widely used two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
methodology (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Ntim, 2011, 2012a, b). However, to make 
sure that the 2SLS methodology is appropriate, and in line with Beiner et al. (2006), we 
first conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (see Beiner et al., 2006: 267) to test 
for the presence of an endogenous link between Q and ALCOM. Applied to equation (1), 
the test fails to accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, and thus, we conclude that 
the 2SLS methodology may be appropriate and that our fixed-effects results may be 
misleading.
 
In the first stage, we predict that the ALCOM will be determined by all the 
control variables contained in equation (1). In the second stage, we employ the predicted 
part of the ALCOM (PRE_ALCOM) as an instrument for ALCOM and re-run equation (1) 
on as follows:
 
                       


n
i
itititiitit CONTROLSALCOMQ
1
10
ˆ                            (2) 
where everything remains the same as specified in equation (1) except that we use the 
predicted ALCOM (PRE_ALCOM) from the first-stage estimation as an instrument for the 
ALCOM. The coefficient on the PRE_ALCOM in Model 8 of Table 2 is positive and 
statistically significant, and thereby indicating that our evidence of a positive effect of 
ALCOM on Q is not sensitive to the presence of potential endogeneity problems that may 
be caused by omitted variables. Overall, the additional analyses indicate that our evidence 
is robust to different types of endogeneity problems and market valuation measures.  
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6. Summary and conclusion  
 This paper has investigated the association between the presence of monitoring 
board committees and market valuation using a sample of South African (SA) listed 
corporations. This coincides with a period during which the SA authorities pursued 
corporate governance policy reforms, which focused primarily on improving board 
accountability, independence and monitoring power in the shape of the 1994 and 2002 
King Reports. We find a significant positive connection between the presence of 
monitoring board committees (i.e., the establishment of audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees) and market valuation, but only in corporations that have 
independent monitoring board committees and/or have all three monitoring board 
committees that we have examined simultaneously. This implies that the stock market 
values corporations with independent and/or the three board committees more highly.  
 Our findings are consistent across a number of econometric models that 
sufficiently address different types of endogeneities and market valuation proxies. Our 
results provide empirical support for agency theory, which indicates that the presence of 
independent monitoring board committees increases the capacity of corporate boards to 
effectively advise, monitor and discipline senior corporate executives, and thereby 
improving market valuation. Our evidence also has important regulatory and policy 
implications. The evidence that the market values only corporations with independent 
monitoring board committees implies that the SA authorities should focus more on 
encouraging firms to go beyond merely establishing the three monitoring board 
committees to having independent monitoring board committees, as recommended by the 
2002 King Report.   
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Table 1: Summary descriptive statistics of all variables for all 845 firm years 
Variable     Mean Median         Std. Dev.       Maximum     Minimum 
 Market valuation (dependent) variables 
Q                  1.56    1.34  0.67             3.60            0.72  
ROA                             0.11    0.12  0.14  0.38           -0.19  
TSR                             0.28    0.25             0.89             2.36           -0.48 
Monitoring board committees (independent) variables 
ACOM       0.91    1.00  0.38             1.00            0.00 
NCOM                            0.47                0.00              0.34                 1.00                0.00  
RCOM                            0.91                1.00              0.37                 1.00                0.00 
ALCOM                          0.45                0.00              0.32                 1.00                0.00 
Control variables 
BIG4                               0.73                1.00               0.44                1.00                0.00 
CAPX                  0.13     0.08   0.15  0.66            0.07 
CGCO       0.32     0.00   0.47  1.00            0.00 
CLIST       0.22     0.00   0.41  1.00            0.00 
LEV                  0.32     0.19              0.31             0.78            0.01 
GOWN                            0.38     0.00   0.49  1.00            0.00 
SGR       0.12     0.14   0.26            0.89           -0.44 
LNTA       5.86                6.02               0.48                7.83                4.24 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), defined as the ratio of total assets minus book value 
of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.  Return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of 
operating profit to total assets. Total shareholder returns (TSR), calculated as annualised total shareholder 
returns made up of share price and dividends. The presence of an audit committee (ACOM), defined as a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has established an audit committee, 0 otherwise. The 
presence of a nomination committee (NCOM), defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm has established a nomination committee, 0 otherwise. The presence of a remuneration committee 
(RCOM), defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has established a remuneration 
committee, 0 otherwise. The presence of audit, nomination, and remuneration committees (ALCOM), 
defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has established audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees, 0 otherwise. Audit firm size (BIG4), measured as a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, 
Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. Capital expenditure (CAPX), calculated as the ratio of total 
capital expenditure to total assets. Cross-listing (CLIST), measured as a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1, if a firm is cross-listed to a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. The presence of a corporate 
governance committee (CGCO), defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up 
a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. Leverage (LEV), calculated as the ratio of total debts to 
market value of equity.  Government ownership (GOWN), measured as a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 0 otherwise. Sales growth (SGR), calculated as the 
current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. Firm size (LNTA), measured as the natural 
log of total assets. 
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Table 2: Estimating the effects of monitoring board committees on market valuation using fixed-effects regressions 
Dependent variable Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 2SLS (Q) 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
(N) 
      0.285 
   6.654*** 
(845) 
         0.318 
      7.679*** 
 (845) 
         0.280 
  6.630*** 
         (845) 
        0.360 
  8.452*** 
(845) 
        0.297 
    7.358*** 
  (845) 
       0.356 
       7.976*** 
       (845) 
0.325 
    7.765*** 
(845) 
      0.375 
      8.710*** 
(845) 
Constant       1.320 
    (0.000)*** 
        1.514 
      (0.000)*** 
         1.310 
       (0.000)*** 
        1.735 
       (0.000)*** 
        1.340 
       (0.000)*** 
       1.658 
  (0.450) 
        1.534 
       (0.000)*** 
     1.980 
   (0.000)*** 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ACOM/IACOM 
 
NCOM/INCOM
 
 
RCOM/IRCOM
 
 
ALCOM 
 
PRE_ALCOM 
     0.003 
    (0.865) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
        0.026* 
      (0.079) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.002 
(0.874) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
             - 
             - 
             - 
             - 
  - 
  - 
         0.126 
        (0.000)*** 
 - 
 - 
       0.042 
      (0.050)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.118 
    (0.000)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  0.065** 
(0.043) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
      0.146 
     (0.000)*** 
Control variables  
BIG4 
 
CAPX 
 
CGCO 
 
CLIST 
 
LEV 
 
GOWN 
 
SGR 
 
LNTA 
 
IND 
YED 
     0.150 
   (0.010)*** 
   -0.015 
   (0.000)*** 
    0.210 
  (0.000)*** 
    0.240 
  (0.032)** 
  -0.018   
  (0.000)*** 
    0.120 
  (0.000)*** 
    0.180 
  (0.000)*** 
  -0.226 
  (0.000)*** 
  Included 
  Included 
       0.149 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.018 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.220 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.279 
      (0.000)**** 
      -0.110 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.123 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.193 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.234 
      (0.000)*** 
     Included 
     Included 
        0.146 
       (0.013)** 
       -0.010 
       (0.000)*** 
        0.218 
       (0.000)*** 
        0.230 
       (0.037)** 
       -0013 
       (0.000)*** 
        0.114 
       (0.013)** 
        0.176 
       (0.000)*** 
       -0.219 
       (0.000)*** 
      Included 
      Included 
       0.158 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.019 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.265 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.274 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.020 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.122 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.183 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.209 
      (0.000)*** 
      Included 
 Included 
       0.144 
      (0.017)** 
      -0.006 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.198 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.229 
      (0.030)** 
      -0.018 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.110 
      (0.026)** 
       0.189 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.210 
      (0.000)*** 
      Included 
      Included 
     0.157 
    (0.000)*** 
     -0.024 
     (0.000)*** 
      0.223 
     (0.000)*** 
      0.237 
     (0.034)** 
    -0.025 
    (0.000)*** 
     0.160 
    (0.000)*** 
     0.190 
    (0.000)***          
    -0.220 
    (0.000)*** 
    Included 
    Included 
0.148 
   (0.011)** 
-0.020 
    (0.00)*** 
0.216 
    (0.000)*** 
 0.240 
    (0.026)** 
-0.026 
     (0.000)*** 
0.154 
    (0.000)*** 
0.153 
   (0.012)** 
-0.229 
     (0.000)*** 
Included 
Included 
0.175 
    (0.000)*** 
     -0.028 
    (0.000)*** 
0.229 
    (0.000)*** 
0.254 
    (0.000)*** 
 -0.030 
     (0.000)*** 
 0.172 
    (0.000)*** 
0.196 
    (0.000)*** 
-0.238 
    (0.000)*** 
Included 
Included 
Notes: Coefficients are on top of parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that a p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using 
the robust clustered standard errors technique. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s (Q), the presence of an audit committee/independent audit committee (ACOM/IACOM), the presence of a 
nomination committee/independent nomination committee (NCOM/INCOM), the presence of a remuneration committee/independent remuneration committee (RCOM/IRCOM), the presence of audit, 
nomination and remuneration committees (ALCOM), predicted  ALCOM  (PRE_ALCOM) – obtained by regressing ALCOM on the control variables and used as an instrument for the ALCOM in model 8, 
audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPX), the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCO), cross-listing (CLIST), leverage (LEV), government ownership (GOWN), firm size 
(LNTA), industry dummies (IND), and year dummies (YED). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
